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COMMUNITY, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE 
SEARCH FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Frederick Schauer* 
We are black, red, white, and yellow; we are Hungarians, Italians, 
Lebanese, Jamaicans, Vietnamese, and Scots; we are Elks, Moose, and 
Sigma Nus; we are bridge players and ship model builders, 
Vermonters and Virginians, Christians and Jews, New Yorkers and 
Philadelphians. But are we Americans? Except in times of war, when 
we feel our sense of national identity intensely, the question is far from 
silly. For it is the question whether, in a nation of subgroups, in a 
nation of primary loyalty to some agglomeration of people less than 
the 240 million that is our population, much remains, or ought to re-
main, of thinking of the nation as a relevant community. 
We are all members of many communities, whether they be fami-
lies, faculties, or whatever. But what is a community? The answer to 
that question may vary depending on the reason for asking it, but here 
I want to think of a community in terms of some divergence of inter-
est, at least in the short term, between individual and community. For 
me a meaningful sense of community exists only insofar as the individ-
uals who comprise that community are willing to take actions on be-
half of the community not only that they would not take on their own 
behalf, but that are quite possibly detrimental to their own interests. 
To think of community is inevitably to think of at least short-term 
altruism, recognizing that perhaps the major force behind that short-
term altruism will be some longer-term payoff for the individual con-
cerned. Nevertheless, as an initial pass at the issues, I want to suggest 
that we cannot think about a meaningful sense of community without 
thinking of some sense of sacrifice. 
I draw on the notion of community as sacrifice in order to make 
the question of community a real one. The tension between individu-
alistic and communitarian perspectives on social, political, and legal 
organization is well known, and the issue is by no means new just 
because it has only recently been discovered by legal scholars. But 
when we think about community, as has recently become fashionable, 
are we doing anything other than using new words to describe our old 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. - Ed. An earlier version of this essay was 
presented in December 1985 at the Sholom Hartman Institute, Jerusalem. 
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intuitions? More specifically, are there situations in which thinking 
about the world in communitarian terms generates different results 
than if we thought about those situations in individualistic terms? If 
there are, will those who think that community is important endorse 
the consequences of that view if those consequences are different from 
the consequences generated by an individualistic view of the world? 
In short, does communitarianism as currently espoused falsify any of 
the results of individualism? If it does not, then we seem to have little 
more than a change in terminology, a desire to use today's fashionable 
language to justify the results we would have advocated even in yester-
day's terms. 
Perspectives on social organization cannot easily or precisely be 
divided into individualist and communitarian. These terms are impre-
cise, but even more, they are relative to the issues that at any time 
confront us. Few people within the mainstream of American political 
thought believe that there ought not to be some substantial concern for 
tolerance, for individual choice, for individual freedom, and for proper 
recognition of individual differences. Similarly, few people within the 
same mainstream believe that communities, whether ethnic, social, 
religious, or political, are unimportant, or that law has no role to play 
both in recognizing and reinforcing these communities. Individualists 
are not anarchists, and communitarians are not seeking to create 1984 
as utopia. Rather, the differences, if any there are, are differences 
about how we will look at the close cases within an existing political 
and legal structure. 1 At the margin, is it important to increase or rein-
force our concern for individual choice and individual differences? Or 
is it instead important, at the margin, to try to increase or reinforce 
community attachments and the sense of community as itself an entity 
worth preserving? At the margin we may discover that how we think 
about these differing perspectives makes a difference. If so, then there 
may be real differences between individualistic and communitarian 
outlooks. Otherwise, we may realize that little more is at stake than 
the use of new words for old ideas. 
As a test of this proposition, I want to explore the issue of alienage 
restrictions. Under what circumstances is it justifiable to draw lines 
based on whether a person is a citizen? Lines drawn on the basis of 
citizenship are a useful test of how seriously we take the idea of the 
nation as a relevant community and, more tangentially, of how seri-
ously we take the idea of community itself. To the extent that we are 
1. As a theory of legal and political change, we must recognize that what is today at the 
margin may tomorrow be in the center, and what is today in the center is substantially deter-
mined by previous decisions at the margin. 
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skeptical of such lines, our concerns are to that extent individual-ori-
ented, primarily focused on the adverse consequences of excluding 
some people from benefits or privileges available to others. But to the 
extent that we are preoccupied with these individualistic ideals, we 
may discover that we weaken a sense of community and dilute the 
social glue that holds us together. Perhaps as an empirical matter this 
is untrue. There are no meters to measure the current extent or inten-
sity of community attachment. But I want at least to offer some spec-
ulations about such matters, recognizing that the issue is not whether 
the empirical speculations are true, but whether it is even permissible 
to speculate about these questions. A good test of whether we remain 
shackled to individualism even as we talk about communitarianism is 
in the extent to which we will seriously contemplate communitarian 
goals that require some sacrifice of individualistic principles. 
I 
The question of restrictions on aliens is a question of distinguishing 
the alien from the citizen, and it is natural to see this kind of issue in 
equal protection terms. But what is it to see an issue in equal protec-
tion terms? Much of our equal protection jurisprudence has been cast 
in terms of levels of scrutiny. Classifications based on race receive 
"strict" scrutiny,2 those based on gender receive scrutiny that is strict 
but not as much so, 3 and so on. Thus, the constitutional validity of a 
classification turns largely on the initial determination of how courts 
are going to look at classifications of this kind, where "this kind" re-
fers to the admittedly contingent larger groupings under which we 
choose to assimilate different legislative actions. Although the stan-
dard terminology refers to "levels of scrutiny" - distinguishing, for 
example, the "strict" scrutiny applicable to racial classifications from 
the "deferential" scrutiny applicable to social and economic regulation 
not involving race or gender4 - I would prefer to think of the issue in 
terms of "attitudes." My attitude toward an article of clothing is 
likely to be different if I choose it myself than if my mother chooses it 
for me. A person's attitude toward preferential hiring on racial 
grounds to remedy past discrimination is likely to vary depending on 
whether it is characterized as "affirmative action" or "reverse discrim-
2. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
3. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976). 
4. E.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). 
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ination." And a lawyer's attitude toward certain facts is likely to vary 
depending on whether the lawyer's task is to prove them or to dis-
prove them. 
In this sense, therefore, a level of scrutiny is a way of talking about 
the attitude with which not only courts, but the larger society of which 
the Constitution is a part, will approach certain forms of legislative 
classifications. Will we be skeptical and inclined to reject, or will we 
be supportive and inclined to accept? 
My specific goal here is to think about the question of attitude, 
using constitutional levels of scrutiny only as an example, with respect 
to classifications based on citizenship in some formal sense. How 
should courts, and how should all of us, think about legislation or 
other governmental action that distinguishes the citizen from the le-
gally resident alien? Should fundamental constitutional liberties be 
available to everyone who happens to be lawfully on American soil, or 
should we protect the speeches of the citizen revolutionary more than 
those of the alien troublemaker? Should citizens be preferred to non-
citizens when the state distributes nonscarce benefits,5 such as welfare, 
social security, or library cards? Should citizens have preference when 
scarce resources are to be allocated, such as places in the entering class 
of a competitive university, research grants from the National Science 
Foundation, or space on the walls of the National Gallery of Art? 
Should citizens be preferred to noncitizens for government employ-
ment? Should noncitizens be barred from holding elective office, or 
even appointive office? 
As I have said, I want to address how the United States as a nation 
thinks about and ought to think about these questions. In itself this is 
not necessarily a question only of constitutional law, and I do not in-
tend what I say to be so limited. But in the United States questions of 
political philosophy and public policy merge into questions of consti-
tutional law with remarkable frequency, and thus I do not think there 
is anything wrong with starting an investigation of attitudes towards 
classifications based on noncitizenship with an investigation of judicial 
attitudes towards such classifications. 
II 
In talking about constitutional law, it is usually a mistake, 
although a prevalent one, to start by talking about recent cases con-
5. By "nonscarce" I mean those governmental benefits whose current methods of allocation 
make the benefit available to all qualified people, recognizing that increasing the size of that pool 
might we!~ result in adoption of new criteria for allocation. 
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tested in the Supreme Court. The nature of constitutional adjudica-
tion is such that Supreme Court cases will invariably be located at the 
edges rather than at the center of the phenomenon being discussed. 6 
Edges may in time become centers, and centers may become edges, but 
to take what the Supreme Court now spends its time on as an indicator 
of what the Constitution now does is the same as taking dusk as an 
indicator of the brightness of t)le day or the darkness of the night. 
Let me be somewhat idiosyncratic, therefore, and start with the 
text of the Constitution in looking at the question of distinctions be-
tween citizens and noncitizens. And in looking at the text, one is 
struck initially by the lack of importance of citizenship. Although ar-
ticle I requires that members of the House of Representatives and 
members of the Senate be citizens, 7 and article II requires that the 
President and Vice-President be natural born citizens,8 citizenship is 
noticeably absent throughout the rest of the document. Nothing in 
article III requires that federal judges be citizens, nor does anything in 
the Constitution require that ambassadors, federal officials, or govern-
mental employees of any kind be citizens. The Bill of Rights, although 
written but a few years after the citizenship language was used in arti-
cles I and II, consistently protects the constitutional rights not of citi-
zens, but of "the people."9 When, in order to reverse the effects of 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 10 the fourteenth amendment provided that 
"all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States,"11 and pro-
hibited states from abridging "the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the United States,"12 it also provided fundamental protections in 
quite different language. In the very same section we see that states 
are not permitted to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law" nor to "deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."13 This contrast between 
what is available to citizens and what is not is highlighted even more 
by the fact that "citizen" again becomes the operative term in subse-
6. I discuss this extensively in Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). 
7. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2. 
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
9. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("the right of the people peaceably to assemble"); U.S. CONST. 
amend. II ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms"). Similar language also appears in 
the fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. The sixth, seventh, and eighth amendments are not 
quite so explicit, but plainly do not limit their protections to citizens. 
10. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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quent amendments guaranteeing the franchise to all citizens of the 
United States regardless of race, 14 sex, 15 and age (so long as they are at 
least eighteen years old).16 
The text thus provides the initial contours of a plan of government 
in which citizenship is a prerequisite for voting and for holding a very 
small number of constitutionally designated positions, but is not a pre-
requisite for any other form of participation in government nor for 
benefiting from the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
And in terms of being entitled to claim constitutional rights, the courts 
have consistently held to the view that "any person within the United 
States, citizen or alien, resident or non-resident, is protected by the 
guarantees of the Constitution."17 Thus the noncitizen as well as the 
citizen is free from arrest for demonstrating in front of the White 
House, the noncitizen as much as the citizen is entitled to the proce-
dural protections of the Bill of Rights before he can be imprisoned for 
a crime, and the alien's freedom of religion is as fully protected as is 
that of the citizen. 
Against this background of a paucity of distinctions between aliens 
and citizens in terms of entitlement to constitutional rights, it may be 
instructive to take a look at the Supreme Court's doctrinally inelegant 
history of dealing with classifications drawn by legislatures that distin-
guish the citizen from the resident alien. Here the issue is not whether 
the noncitizen can claim constitutional rights. Instead, it is whether a 
statutory or other legislative or administrative action that draws dis-
tinctions between the citizen and the alien will be treated, constitution-
ally, with an attitude of deference or with an attitude of suspicion. 
The issue here is not whether aliens have determinant rights to some 
particular treatment. It is whether with respect to allocation of scarce 
or nonscarce resources, or with respect to government regulation of 
any kind, a line drawn on the basis of citizenship is constitutionally 
permissible, regardless of the status or importance of the benefit that is 
being granted or withheld. 
Traditionally the states were constitutionally permitted to impose 
special restrictions on aliens, and to reserve some benefits exclusively 
for citizens. Thus, cases from the early part of this century upheld, 
against constitutional attack, state laws prohibiting aliens from own-
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX,§ 1. 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
17. Sam Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 745, 749 (9th Cir. 1972). The case law can be 
traced back to Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). · 
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ing land, 18 laws barring aliens from working on public construction 
contracts, 19 and laws allowing only citizens the privilege of harvesting 
wildlife.20 And although at about this time the Supreme Court struck 
down a statute substantially restricting the abilities of noncitizens to 
obtain private employment,21 the Court in the same case thought it 
important to reaffirm that with respect to public employment or any-
thing else that was part of the "public domain" restrictions on aliens 
would be constitutionally permissible.22 
More recently, the attitude towards restrictions on aliens has 
changed. In the late 1940s a number of cases, relying explicitly or 
implicitly on the specific constitutional mandate to Congress to regu-
late the naturalization process, prohibited the states from classifying 
on the basis of citizenship, on the theory that such classifications im-
posed burdens on aliens not authorized by Congress.23 But in the 
1970s the congressional control rationale was jettisoned, and the 
Supreme Court was comfortable in saying that a classification based 
on citizenship was "suspect" and thus to be viewed by the Constitu-
tion with extreme skepticism. 
This series of developments is traceable to Graham v. Richard-
son, 24 in which the Court struck down a state law denying welfare 
benefits to aliens: "[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based 
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judi-
cial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and 
insular' minority25 for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is ap-
propriate."26 Shortly after Graham, the Supreme Court applied its ra-
tionale to a context less emotionally appealing than the denial of 
welfare benefits to aliens. In In re Griffiths, 27 the Court struck down 
an exclusion of aliens from the practice of law, and in Sugarman v. 
18. Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923). 
19. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915). 
20. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914). 
21. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
22. 239 U.S. at 39-40. 
23. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commn., 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 
U.S. 633, 649 (1948) (Black, J., concurring). For commentary on this approach to alienage clas· 
sifications, see Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 19 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 1023, 1063-64 (1979); Note, State Burdens on Resident Aliens: A New Preemption Analy-
sis, 89 YALE L.J. 940 (1980). 
24. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
25. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938): "(P]rejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to cur· 
tail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, 
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." 
26. 403 U.S. at 371-72 (footnotes and citation omitted, footnote added). 
27. 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
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Dougall, 28 a statute limiting permanent civil service employment to 
citizens was similarly invalidated. 
The results in these cases followed, doctrinally, from the fact that a 
judicial attitude of suspicion has overwhelmingly produced the conse-
quence of invalidation.29 But it seems to have been the very harshness 
of the doctrine that led to a change in the Court's treatment of alien-
age. Unwilling to prohibit citizenship from being a factor in, for ex-
ample, determining whether a person could run for statewide elective 
office, the Court held that a state may require citizenship not only for 
elective office, but also for any governmental officer or employee 
whose function goes "to the heart of representative government" in 
the sense of being directly involved in the "formulation, execution, or 
review" of broad public policy determinations. 30 Employing this stan-
dard, the Court then adopted an attitude of deference toward state 
policies restricting to citizens positions such as law-enforcement of-
ficers31 and school teachers,32 while striking down restrictions on 
aliens when applied to notaries public33 and licensed civil engineers. 34 
In deciding these and other cases, the Supreme Court has made the 
extent of deference tum on the nature of the position or benefit in-
volved, rather than on anything inherent in the alien-citizen distinc-
tion regardless of where applied. This is rather at odds with the more 
traditional methods of equal protection analysis, 35 but parsing the 
cases and the fine strands of doctrine is not my agenda here. For 
although many may quarrel with where the doctrinal lines are now 
drawn, or with the seeming contraction of protection of noncitizens 
since the early 1970s,36 it remains the case that a governmental entity, 
28. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
29. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, 8 (1972) ("scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory 
and fatal in fact"). 
30. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). 
31. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
32. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
33. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984). 
34. Examining Bd. of Engrs., Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 
(1976); see also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (striking down an undifferenti-
ated exclusion of aliens from the federal civil service). Although not an employment case, a 
similar analysis is found in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. I (1977), in which the Court invalidated 
a citizenship requirement for holders of state scholarships. A more deferential approach is taken, 
however, when the line is drawn between classes of aliens rather than between aliens and citizens. 
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
35. See O'Fallon, To Preserve the Conception of a Political Community, 51 U. DET. J. URB. 
L. 777 (1980). 
36. For such commentary, see Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to 
Vote?, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977); Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory 
Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275; Walter, The Alien's Right to 
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especially one not part of the federal government,37 must provide some 
special sort of justification for treating aliens differently. The niceties 
of doctrine should not detract from the fact that, even under the rather 
large exceptions of the recent cases, the governmental entity must 
demonstrate entitlement to an exception that, however broad, is still 
not without real limits. What emerges is still, therefore, a general atti-
tude that something at least faintly suspicious is going on when a state 
makes citizenship an important classifying factor. But what is the 
source of this attitude? 
III 
The Supreme Court has found its exceptions to the general rule of 
strict scrutiny for alienage classifications to reside in the notion of a 
"political community" of citizens. 38 The negative implication of this 
is, of course, according to the accepted wisdom, that outside of some 
notion of the political community one's status as citizen does not or 
ought not matter. Alexander Bickel found it "gratifying ... that we 
live under a Constitution to which the concept of citizenship matters 
very little, that prescribes decencies and wise modalities of government 
quite without regard to the concept of citizenship."39 John Hart Ely 
takes the alien's very exclusion from political participation as a strong 
reason to grant special judicial solicitude.40 Yet both of these views, as 
well as many others, are focused on the status of the noncitizen and on 
the disadvantages the noncitizen might be under during the (theoreti-
cally and generally) limited time that a resident alien remains a 
non citizen. 
Instead of this, I want to think about purposes the very concept of 
citizenship may serve in American society. I want at least to consider 
the possibility that the notion of citizenship may help bind together 
those who are citizens, and that a stronger sense of citizenship, and a 
larger role for citizenship, may make those bonds stronger. If this is 
the case, then we may see more clearly the tension between individual-
ism and communitarianism, because a focus on the status of the non-
citizen, a concern for those who are disadvantaged, may result in 
weakening the bonds between existing members of the community. 
Work and the Political Community's Right to Govern, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1181 (1979); Note, A 
Dual Standard for State Discrimination Against Aliens, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1516 (1979). 
37. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
38. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642-43 (1973). 
39. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 53-54 (1975). 
40. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 161-62 (1980). 
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Conversely, it is likely that a concern for those bonds can effectively be 
put into practice only at the expense of those who are excluded. 
By referring to the "political community," the judicial and legal 
conception of citizenship has been largely conjoined with the idea of 
government. If active participation in the process of governing is not 
involved, then citizenship is and should be irrelevant. But why is this 
so? Is it possible that citizenship can serve other social or symbolic 
functions? Might not those functions be especially important in a soci-
ety lacking other, perhaps more natural, forms of social cohesion? I 
do not want to argue that this should be the case, that citizenship 
should be taken to be more important than it now is. But I do want to 
argue that there is another side to the debate, that treating citizenship 
as largely inconsequential does have costs, and that the assessment of 
the consequences of these costs is likely to be proportionate to one's 
feelings about the very notion of community. 
IV 
One of the more interesting features of contemporary France is the 
current redoubled effort to protect the French language from incur-
sions by foreign words, especially English. Although the very exist-
ence of the Academie fran9aise testifies to the special importance of 
the French language in the preservation of the community that is 
France, the more recent phenomenon of a governmental agency -
The High Committee for the Preservation and Expansion of the 
French Language - is even more notable. This committee41 was fol-
lowed by ministerial Commissions on Terminology42 charged with 
finding out what foreign terms were then in use within the jurisdic-
tions of particular ministries and determining what was to be done 
with respect to those terms.43 Thus commissions now determine what 
foreign words are outlawed in all state documents. They deal not only 
with trade, but with sports, housing, and virtually all other areas of 
governmental activity. Although there are the occasional grudging ex-
ceptions for words such as "vodka" and "gorgonzola," the contempo-
rary French scene is marked by a vigorous attempt to expunge from 
French culture not only "le sweater" and "le weekend," but also "le 
fog dispersal," "le byte," and "le package tour." Some of this may 
41. See Munday, Legislating in Defense of the French Language, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 218, 
220 & n.10 (1985) (citing Decree No. 66-203 of Mar. 31, 1966, Journal Officiel de la Republique 
Frani;aise, Apr. 7, 1966, at 2795, as the government decree that established the committee). 
42. See Munday, supra note 41, at 220 & n.11 (citing Ministerial Order of July 7, 1970 (un-
published), and Ministerial Order of June 16, 1971, 1971 Juris-Classeur Periodique III, 38009, as 
the orders which created the commissions). 
43. See generally Munday, supra note 41. 
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undoubtedly seem silly, but it is a reflection of the extent to which 
France sees the French language as central to the notion of a 
community. 
Parallel forms of community identity exist in other nations. In 
Israel the Jewish religion seems to fulfill many of the same functions 
and explains why many Israelis see governmental enforcement of reli-
gious law as centrally important. The unacceptability of civil marriage 
and divorce, as well as attempts to ban the selling of pork or the play-
ing of soccer on Saturdays, are from one perspective extreme but from 
another perspective merely the embodiment of efforts to entrench Ju-
daism as the organizing symbol of the nation. And perhaps for those 
Israelis who disagree with many of these policies, or who are not espe-
cially religious, it is the Holocaust, or the creation of the state in 1948, 
or the war in 1967, that serves much the same organizing function in 
helping to constitute a society. 
On the issue of what it takes to constitute a community, the Hart-
Devlin debate is instructive.44 Lord Devlin's view that shared notions 
of sexual morality are necessary to constitute a community is at the 
least subject to dispute; to me it is most likely wrong. Nevertheless, 
his more fundamental and less controversial point is that there must 
be something other than geographic boundaries and a shared jurisdic-: 
tion under a common legal sovereign that is necessary for the existence 
of a community. What this something is varies from community to 
community. The French language for the French, Judaism for many 
Israelis, a soccer team for the depressed cities of Liverpool and 
Manchester, a football team for the unappreciated cities of Oakland 
and Pittsburgh, the royal family for the English, and so on; all serve 
this symbolic bonding function in some way. 
I do not mean to say that any of my particular socio-cultural ob-
servations are not open to question. Some may doubt the effectiveness 
of these particular symbols, or suggest that these cultures may have 
other and more important organizing strands that I have ignored. 
These quarrels are not central here. Rather, I mention these examples 
only to focus on the idea of an organizing symbol as a prerequisite for 
a sense of community, and thus to look at what might serve this func-
tion in the United States. 
Although the political right in the United States has at the moment 
focused on the English language as a possible source of social cohe-
sion, 45 this seems more a reaction to recent Spanish-speaking immi-
44. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959) (Maccabaean Lecture in Jurispru· 
dence of the British Academy); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963). 
45. See former Senator S.I. Hayakawa's initiative to have an English Language Amendment 
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grants than to something special about language. I mention language 
use only as an example of the problem of community in a nation that 
is comprised of numerous different nationalities, numerous different 
second languages, numerous different religions, and a general rever-
ence for pluralism and tolerance that at least sounds good in an Inde-
pendence Day parade - even if frightfully few Americans are 
especially willing to be pluralistic or tolerant with respect to the per-
son next door. But even if pluralism is best when practiced Some-
where Else, it remains the case that neither language, nor religion, nor 
nationality, nor shared moral or political views, is a likely candidate 
for the communitarian symbol that seems to be a part of all true 
communities. 46 
Against this background, consider citizenship as possibly serving 
precisely this community-bonding function. To some extent symbols 
may serve important organizing and bonding functions even if they are 
in many respects artificial. Sports teams are a good example of this 
phenomenon. But symbols that hold communities together, and that 
may help to create the environment in which people are willing to 
sacrifice their own short-term welfare for the good of others, or for the 
good of the community at large, are likely to be more effective in per-
forming that function if they at least reflect some underlying reality. 
Thus, the arguments for making citizenship matter become stronger 
insofar as citizenship indeed reflects something about this country. 
We ought therefore to think about the extent to which there might be 
something special about citizenship in the United States that could be 
said to parallel the place of language, religion, and so on in other 
societies. 
Unlike ethnicity, religion, and even language to some extent, citi-
zenship is technically available to all residents who wish it. And 
although there may be some economic impediments to becoming a cit-
izen, it remains substantially a club open to all. In terms of the lines 
commonly and unfortunately drawn between the ins and the outs in 
this and other countries, citizenship is a remarkably accessible goal. It 
added to the Constitution of the United States. The amendment, which provides simply that 
"[t]he English language shall be the official language of the United States," is now pending before 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. S.J. Res. 20, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.J. 
Res. 96, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
46. It is tempting to see pluralism and tolerance themselves as our organizing ideal. See, e.g., 
Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986); 
see also Sherry, The Gender of Judges, 4 L. & INEQUALITY 159, 169 (1986). It is ultimately an 
empirical question whether something other than celebration of our differences is necessary to 
hold us together as a nation. I do not mean to suggest that tolerance as an organizing ideal is not 
important. But I do mean at least to open for discussion whether it can perform this function by 
itself. Perhaps it can, but that proposition is by no means self-evident. 
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is easier for a noncitizen to become a citizen than for a black to be-
come white, for the poor to become rich, for a woman to become a 
man, or for Giorgio Bussioni to become George Bush. 
If I am correct in supposing that citizenship can be an important 
symbol in terms of a club that anyone can join regardless of the imped-
iments placed on achieving any other form of social equality, then it 
follows that citizenship may in some way be the appropriate symbol of 
the American dream. Indeed, it was to many of our ancestors, and it 
remains so for many people today. We are rapidly in the process of 
burying the myth of Horatio Alger. You can't get rich (or even not 
poor) in contemporary America just by working hard. But this image 
served in the past as an important source of American social cohesion. 
What will replace it? One answer is a society in which commitment to 
that society is the ticket of entry. By having a great deal tum on some-
thing that is not a function of your faith, your skin color, your wealth, 
your old school tie, where your grandfather was born, and who your 
mother was, the symbol of citizenship does more than merely fill a 
vacuum created by the death of Horatio Alger. It can provide a posi-
tive statement about what is special about the United States, or at least 
what can be special about the United States. 
If it is the case that citizenship, by virtue of its accessibility, may 
serve important symbolic functions, then how might that symbol be 
strengthened? Perhaps it is the unfortunate side of human nature that 
finds it necessary to exclude some in order to form a bond for those 
included, but little in history or current experience belies this impres-
sion. In order for the "ins" to feel better about themselves, to be will-
ing to make individual sacrifices for the group benefit, and to feel a 
strong sense qf community identity, there must, regrettably, be some 
"outs." The law and other forms of official action can choose to ig-
nore this phenomenon, but in doing so they run the risks that people 
will find their inness and others' outness in the more traditional forms 
of distinctions based on skin color, gender, religion, grandparents' 
birthplace, wealth, sexual preference, physical appearance, presence or 
absence of disability, and so on. Or law may help to create a national 
community that tries to transcend these lines, and citizenship may be a 
way for this to happen. 
But we do not make citizenship more important merely by talking 
about it. Citizenship is likely to be perceived as important to the ex-
tent that it is important, and it will in fact be important to the extent 
that various tangible benefits or entitlements tum on citizenship. The 
more we make significant economic and social advantages tum on citi-
zenship, the more we will disadvantage, usually temporarily, those 
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who are noncitizens to the benefit of those who are citizens. We use 
citizenship to strengthen our sense of national community by making 
those who are citizens feel especially good about that status, and we do 
that by investing that status with something real, such as preferences 
for a wide range of governmental entitlements. In preferring some, we 
of course do. not prefer others, and it is in a way sad and in a way 
paradoxical that we hold ourselves together by fencing others out. But 
that it is sad and paradoxical does not make the phenomenon less real. 
It is a mistake to think that we do not now draw these distinctions, 
even though citizenship is largely irrelevant. Rather, the locus has 
been shifted to the immigration decision, and the desire to make some-
thing special out of being an American is reflected in the desire'to keep 
out those whose only crime is having been born too late. But maybe it 
is not necessary to tear down the Statue of Liberty in order to build a 
sense of community. Investing citizenship with an importance it does 
not now possess might provide a comparatively benign outlet for the 
exclusionary impulses that seem inevitably to be a part of community 
bonding. 
v 
The question of citizenship, for which I do not profess to have an 
answer, thus provides a good laboratory to study the question of com-
munity. As I suggested at the outset of this essay, it is easy to espouse 
communitarian values as long as that espousal does not require relin-
quishing individualistic results. But the hope of having both may be 
unrealistic. More likely is a world in which community attachment is 
a function of something shared by the members of the community, and 
not shared by others. To the extent that we wish to take community 
seriously, we will inevitably hurt those who do not share in what the 
community holds in common. 
As a nation we may, therefore, choose to minimize our commit-
ment to the nation as a community, reserving the feeling of being an 
American for the Fourth of July, and reserving sacrifices in the name 
of Americanism for April 15 and times of war. But there are costs to 
this, as we can see by the ineffectiveness of attempts to marshal com-
munity support for personal sacrifice during, for example, periods of 
oil shortage, very high inflation, trade imbalances, or budget deficits. 
Perhaps our inability to be a national community is just a given. But if 
it is not, then it is important that we recognize that some set of inclu-
sions and exclusions is necessary to create this sense, and citizenship 
holds out the possibility of serving this function substantially less in-
vidiously than most other candidates for the task. 
